

11-4073-a

20 MAY 1959

Major General James H. Walsh
Asst. Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Department of the Air Force
Headquarters U. S. Air Force
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Jim:

Thank you very much for your memorandum of 8 May entitled, "Propaganda Analysis and Indications of Hostilities" which I read with a great deal of interest.

I have asked our people over here to study this problem as I agree it is an important one. You will be receiving a more detailed reply in due course.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

Allen W. Dulles
Director

O/DCI/ [redacted]

19 May 1959

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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11-4073


8 MAY 1959

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: (S) Propaganda Analysis and Indications of Hostilities

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4. Expert opinion sustains the view that the tension level in the Soviet Bloc is carefully managed. On empirical grounds, past Soviet practice is to have propaganda prepare the people for critical state actions, whether of aggression or of retreat. Although Soviet Bloc communicators can perhaps afford to be very cavalier in what they say to the outside world, they are extremely circumspect in what they say to the Iron Curtain audience. It seems safe to say that they would prepare their own populace, even if indirectly, for the possibility of war. Even a decision to undertake a surprise attack seems likely, because of the nature of the decision-making process in the Soviet Bloc,

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to reflect itself in what communicators say or refrain from saying, particularly in view of the extremely rigid patterns of Soviet propaganda. (SECRET)

5. The search for indicators of Soviet policy determinations is based on identifying unique elements which appear in the "take." This requires exhaustive analysis over a period of time, for it is essential that the current take be compared with that during prior crises from every conceivable point of view. Only by building up a body of historical data, analyzed regularly in depth, can valid indicators be identified which would lend themselves to the "quick response" appraisals which are needed to help solve the warning problem. (SECRET)

6. Taken in conjunction with other indicators and projected historically, such daily analysis should provide an important, perhaps uniquely valuable, tool for appraising the imminence of hostilities. In fact, with the arrival of the missile age, the importance of this tool may be enhanced, particularly since the classical indicators may prove increasingly difficult to pick up in time to be useful. (SECRET)



8. While we recognize [redacted] output is already piped into the warning structure, notably from time to time as an input to the Watch Committee of USIB, the very bulk of the materials makes their proper utilization difficult. We understand that such reporting has in the past dealt largely with "qualitative indicators." It has only to a limited degree dealt with "quantitative indicators" and has not represented a systematic comparison with other current or previous crisis situations. (SECRET)

9. In addition to what we now receive, we need for Air Force indications purposes exhaustive and systematic reporting on current changes in the thrust of propaganda in the Soviet Union, Communist China, and the Satellites. This could be provided by daily reporting of statistical quantitative and qualitative factors, together with a short estimate of what it means, which could be plotted in Indications Centers throughout the world. Air Force Intelligence is prepared to cooperate to the maximum extent practicable. (SECRET)

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10. We recognize that this undertaking would impose an additional load on an already burdened staff. The cost in manpower and effort, however, seems likely to be more than outweighed by the value of the indications tool which could be developed over a period of time and by the essentiality of improving the validity of indications as the period of "push-button" warfare approaches. In this brief memorandum, I cannot spell out adequately the details of the factors of analysis and the methods of presentation. A period of experimentation may prove necessary before any approach can be validated. Your experts are aware of the problem, and if you will give your early approval in principle to this project, my people are fully prepared to sit down with them and work out the details. (SECRET)



JAMES H. WALSH
MAJOR GENERAL, USAF
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF,
INTELLIGENCE

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Dulles *DeLo*

A copy of the attached Memorandum has already been sent to DD/I (Attn:) for preparation of an appropriate reply for your signature.

After you have noted, I will show it to General Cabell.

AA
13 May
(DATE)

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